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For: Ambassador Ayela Lasso 1 : : 
UN High Commissioner for Hljlnm Rights 
I . 
Information: Mr. Mautner-Markhof 
Chief, Special Procedure!! r 
UN Human Rights CeJ!~,er ' 
Arthur E. (G~ne) Dewey \e•.A .... 
Executive Dlrec!nt : 
Congressionlli Hunger ter . 
4[;·· 
Subject: Back-up for UN Senior OfficiaJ1s meeting :on Rwanda -Nov. 8, 1994 
Date: November 7, 1994 
1. Fil:st, my respect and appreciation for ~l,e rapid dispatoh of documentation relating 
to tho presslr,_g needs noted in my 4 Novemller fa~~.. Thlli means we should he ahle to 
exploit rapidly the progzess made by Georg Ma1..1tner-Markhof in Geneva. We can also 
build on the solid human and material resbm<.:C fouhdation laid by Bill Cl=ncc's 
leatl=hip in the field. 
2. Sumn1arv 
The follo•.ving obscn-ations arc forwarded as baCkground suppvr! for !he talking 
point~ Rill C:larence is submitting: 
a. The hwnall righlll op~rdlional mandil.te of ymtr office fllls a maior gap in the 
international humatlitarian community .. 
b. A successful Hu:nan Rights field operation ili Rwanda under this m~ndatc is 
absolutely essential, both for thcsakc of Rwanda and for the fulur~ viability of your 
office. 
c. You bave been given an historic oppnthmity m mmpletne.ot and add value to your 
UN opetational pati:ner agencies in ftie field -- through D.Bserting, and without 
comprom.isi:1g, thQ mandate distinctive bf yuur office. 
d. Priority emphasis must now be p!ac~d on sirengthcning the operaliuna! support 
sioows i11 Geneva and Kigali, e~enr!~l to ac.complishing your -vital missioo in 
Rwanda. 
3. Filling tlle Gap 
Yow- mamlalc p~rlliins lo the rnnt cause'> of r.omplex lmmanitarian emergencies. No 
other part of the UN, neither UNHCR nor the P!Jlitico.! Department, can address root causes 
in the operational way with wltidt yuu are mandated. While the world comm.unity i; very 
late in ~stablishir"! your office to help fill this gap, it is fortunately, but sndly, not too late. 
There "-fe 21 other complcl\ huma;;itation emergencies besides Rwll!1ua; there are also, 
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4. The Impemtive of Success ln Rwanda. 
Hllm?.n Rights success in R1J1.11nda does not me4n that your offio~ succeeds in t~o 
major task of put!i.!lg the country back together. Succosp for your .bffiC<> Ill Rw1.1.mla entmls 
proper ~electlon. pr~:p~:~redness, training, and ~.quipping of hunian rights teams which 
discharge maturely and professionally your three R~-speclfiQ' mandated duties: 
a. Investiga.tion/documenmtlcm of acts of gen.oei~e. 
b. IImnan rights monitoring to promot~: a diinate of confidence for return of 
refugees and Internally displaced persons. 
c. Capauily-builuing assistmioe for the administration of juStice. 
Given this definition of success, then: i;; a strong chance )'lour mission in Rwanda 
will succeed, To the extent you succeed in Rwanda, intemationnl respect nnd SUJl!lort for 
your office in the futllr; will be proportionawly affected. 
5. Role on the Terun of UN Operational Agencies 
The role of your office is both distinctive and o~mplementilr"J. Distinctive in that 
your task is U!llque. not duplicatine or cvwpcti\1g with other l JN mandates. 
Complementary, in that other tJN agencies need effective pertbrma.'lce from your office. 
For example, the Refugee High Commissionllt needs yoi.l to deal with roul caUlles so as to 
prevent or slop refugee floW!<, help create an environment fer repatriation, and to assist in 
confidence-building which repatriation needs to endur¢. Your full partidp11.tion on the 
lnteragoncy Standing Commlttee team is abo important - not re~st to insure that DHA 
accords highest priority to funding your activities through tJN oonsolidated appeals. 
6. Slreey;!bwjng the Oner§tional 8HPJ2Q!! System 
You took comrnendabl~ p~n;onal leadership In responding to intense pressure to 
deploy rapidly a h= right$ presence in the field. You placed an cKpetienccd, 
professional leader in the field. Dill Clarence, who bas m!u.l~ exlmordinary progress despite 
llf"~l obstacles. Nnw lt is tlm~ to build on thls progress by insisting on: 
a. Recruii.lng only experien~d . !ttaff which are already matured through extensive 
field background and possessing good judgement wiih respect to human justice. 
h. Preparing these recruits through a professionally directed preparedness progratn 
i.'l. Geneva, followed by a further orientation prollram iu Kigali drawing on 
cunl~mpura.'leous cases in the fleld. 
c. A highly r~sponsivc administrativ" uapability in Geneva which draws on the 
procurement competeMe ofexp~nced agencies such as UNHCR. 
d. A highly professi'-'Ilal administrative capacity in Klg~U in the areas of personnel, 
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f!lii1UCc, aud lollistics to permit optinuiJ pertormmQ$ from staff performing the three 
operational functions in Rwtmda. A ~ood start 4as been made in the field, Geneva 
headquarters needs to listen !IIld. re!lp()nd adeq1J4tely to field suggestions regardiuj: 
requir~m~nts. ' 
7. Conclusion 
It is gratifying to ~n!izl: that your on;ice eT\inys: both political support, and 110 fllf, 
:fin1111cial support needed for the taqk !n R.W!lll<ila. 'ihe admtiollll! holp in administration !llld 
lollistics know-how is beginning to materialiic. It is oow a matter of continuing to give 
your personal, high level support to ruengthening the ~'ita! sinew~~ of professional human 
rcsourc~. prepa!"edness, and logistic/~sti:ative bCICk-up. 
There must also be coorrnous personal satisfaction fur you. You axe advocating a 
modest invesnnent which can bring extraordinary returns in reducing human misery and 
cost to the international community for Rwanda today, and Rwanda-like situations 
tomonvw. 
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